
Professor Guy Kahane
I work in moral philosophy. The philosophical questions that interest me all have an ethical component: in one way or another, they are about what matters, what is good or bad, or what we ought to do, want or feel. But my research covers a very wide range of topics and some of it links to other areas such as philosophy of religion, psychology and neuroscience, and medicine.
One strand of my research is concerned with grand existential questions. For example, is it possible that nothing matters and, if that’s so, would *that* matter? Does the vastness of the cosmos mean that humanity is cosmically insignificant? Should we hope that God exists or should we perhaps wish that He doesn’t? How should we feel about the terrible tragedies of human history once we recognize that we, and pretty much everyone now around, wouldn’t have existed if these past tragedies were avoided?
I also work on much more concrete, practical questions in applied ethics. Much of this research is linked to my longstanding connection to Oxford’s Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, a world famous research centre devoted to applying ethics to real-life dilemmas. Questions I have written on in this area include: Can you harm someone just by bringing them into existence? Would it be wrong to use biotechnology or neural interventions to enhance core human capacities—by, for example, making people smarter or happier or even more moral? How should we conceptualize disability or harm? What ethical principles should guide the programming of driverless cars?
A third key area of my research is what is sometimes called ‘moral psychology’—the interdisciplinary project of trying to understand the psychological, neural and evolutionary basis of human morality. My work in this area often involves heavy collaboration with researchers from other disciplines, such as social and developmental psychologists and neuroscientists. For example, we have used techniques such as functional MRI, pharmacological interventions and large-scale data collection via the internet to study the processes that underlie people’s responses to moral dilemmas such as the famous ‘trolley’ scenarios, the psychology of racial bias, and the factors that shape people’s thinking about the moral status of animals.
I have been at Pembroke since 2010—first as a Research Fellow, while I was completing a Wellcome Trust funded project, and then as Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy. One of the nice things in Pembroke is that we teach philosophy in combination with a wide range of other subjects—ranging from physics to PPE, theology and modern languages—which makes for an especially diverse and vibrant student body. A lot of my teaching at Pembroke is unsurprisingly related to ethics. I regularly teach the first year introductory course on Moral Philosophy, as well as Finalist courses in Ethics and Practical Ethics. I also teach Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, and Wittgenstein. In addition, I am the course director of Oxford’s MSt in Practical Ethics, a part-time graduate course—and many of its students are also at Pembroke.
I did my graduate studies at Oxford—completing a Masters (BPhil) and then PhD (DPhil) here. I have been here ever since, starting with a postdoctoral position at the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics. While my graduate work focused on more theoretical and ‘meta-ethical’ issues, while at the Uehiro Centre I also begun work in applied ethics as well as developed a wide range of interdisciplinary collaborations in moral psychology. I was the Uehiro Centre’s Deputy Director from 2006 to 2017, when I became the Course Director for the new MSt graduate course, and the Uehiro Centre’s Director of Studies. I received a 5-year University Award in Biomedical Ethics from the Wellcome Trust in 2009, and joined Pembroke, first as Research Fellow, and then as Fellow and Tutor, once I have completed this large research project. Before that, I was also a Junior Research Fellow at Somerville College for several years.
I have edited two books and published nearly 100 articles. These include:
ETHICS
Kahane, G. and Savulescu, J. 2009. ‘Brain-Damage and the Moral Significance of Consciousness’, The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy.
Kahane, G., and Savulescu, J. 2009. ‘The Welfarist Account of Disability’, in K. Brownlee and A. Cureton, eds., Disability and Disadvantage, Oxford University Press.
Kahane, G. 2011. ‘Evolutionary Debunking Arguments’, Noûs.
Kahane, G. 2011. ‘Should We Want God to Exist?’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Kahane, G. 2011. ‘Mastery Without Mystery: Why there is no Promethean Sin in Enhancement’, The Journal of Applied Philosophy.
Kahane, G. 2014. ‘Our Cosmic Insignificance’, Noûs.
Kahane, G. 2017. ‘If Nothing Matters’, Noûs.
Kahane, G. 2019. ‘History and Persons’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Savulescu, J. Kahane, G. and Gyngell, C., 2019. ‘From Public Preferences to Ethical Policy’, Nature: Human Behaviour.
Kahane, G. 2021. ‘Is the Universe Indifferent? Should We Care?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Kahane, G. ‘Meaningfulness and Importance’ forthcoming in Landau, I., ed., The Oxford Handbook of Meaning in Life, OUP.
MORAL PSYCHOLOGY/NEUROSCIENCE
Kahane, G., Wiech, K., Shackel, N., Farias, M., Savulescu J. and Tracey, I. 2012. ‘The Neural Basis of Intuitive and Counterintuitive Moral Judgement’, Social, Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience.
Kahane, G., Everett, J., Earp, B., Farias, M. and Savulescu, J., 2015. ‘‘Utilitarian’ Judgment in Sacrificial Dilemmas Does Not Reflect Impartial Concern for the Greater Good’.
Kahane, G., Everett, J., Earp, B., Caviola, L., Faber, N., Crockett, M., Savulescu, J. 2018. ‘Beyond Sacrificial Harm: A Two-Dimensional Model of Utilitarian Psychology’, Psychological Review.
Kahane, G. 2016. ‘Is, Ought, and the Brain’, in S. M. Liao, ed., Moral Brains: The Neuroscience of Morality, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Demaree-Cotton, J. and Kahane, G. 2019. ‘The Neuroscience of Moral Judgment’, in A. Zimmerman, K. Jones, and M. Timmons, eds., The Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology.
Everett, J. and Kahane, G. 2020. ‘Switching Tracks: A Multi-Dimensional Model of Utilitarian Psychology’, Trends in Cognitive Sciences.
Wilks, M., Caviola, L., Kahane, G., Bloom, P. 2021. ‘Children Prioritize Humans Over Animals Less Than Adults Do’, Psychological Science.
Caviola, L., Kahane, G., Everett, J., Teperman, E., Savulescu, J., and Faber, N. 2021. ‘Utilitarianism for Animals, Kantianism for People? Harming Animals and Humans for the Greater Good’, the Journal of Experimental Psychology: General.
Professor Guy Kahane

I work in moral philosophy. The philosophical questions that interest me all have an ethical component: in one way or another, they are about what matters, what is good or bad, or what we ought to do, want or feel. But my research covers a very wide range of topics and some of it links to other areas such as philosophy of religion, psychology and neuroscience, and medicine.
One strand of my research is concerned with grand existential questions. For example, is it possible that nothing matters and, if that’s so, would *that* matter? Does the vastness of the cosmos mean that humanity is cosmically insignificant? Should we hope that God exists or should we perhaps wish that He doesn’t? How should we feel about the terrible tragedies of human history once we recognize that we, and pretty much everyone now around, wouldn’t have existed if these past tragedies were avoided?
I also work on much more concrete, practical questions in applied ethics. Much of this research is linked to my longstanding connection to Oxford’s Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, a world famous research centre devoted to applying ethics to real-life dilemmas. Questions I have written on in this area include: Can you harm someone just by bringing them into existence? Would it be wrong to use biotechnology or neural interventions to enhance core human capacities—by, for example, making people smarter or happier or even more moral? How should we conceptualize disability or harm? What ethical principles should guide the programming of driverless cars?
A third key area of my research is what is sometimes called ‘moral psychology’—the interdisciplinary project of trying to understand the psychological, neural and evolutionary basis of human morality. My work in this area often involves heavy collaboration with researchers from other disciplines, such as social and developmental psychologists and neuroscientists. For example, we have used techniques such as functional MRI, pharmacological interventions and large-scale data collection via the internet to study the processes that underlie people’s responses to moral dilemmas such as the famous ‘trolley’ scenarios, the psychology of racial bias, and the factors that shape people’s thinking about the moral status of animals.
I have been at Pembroke since 2010—first as a Research Fellow, while I was completing a Wellcome Trust funded project, and then as Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy. One of the nice things in Pembroke is that we teach philosophy in combination with a wide range of other subjects—ranging from physics to PPE, theology and modern languages—which makes for an especially diverse and vibrant student body. A lot of my teaching at Pembroke is unsurprisingly related to ethics. I regularly teach the first year introductory course on Moral Philosophy, as well as Finalist courses in Ethics and Practical Ethics. I also teach Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, and Wittgenstein. In addition, I am the course director of Oxford’s MSt in Practical Ethics, a part-time graduate course—and many of its students are also at Pembroke.
I did my graduate studies at Oxford—completing a Masters (BPhil) and then PhD (DPhil) here. I have been here ever since, starting with a postdoctoral position at the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics. While my graduate work focused on more theoretical and ‘meta-ethical’ issues, while at the Uehiro Centre I also begun work in applied ethics as well as developed a wide range of interdisciplinary collaborations in moral psychology. I was the Uehiro Centre’s Deputy Director from 2006 to 2017, when I became the Course Director for the new MSt graduate course, and the Uehiro Centre’s Director of Studies. I received a 5-year University Award in Biomedical Ethics from the Wellcome Trust in 2009, and joined Pembroke, first as Research Fellow, and then as Fellow and Tutor, once I have completed this large research project. Before that, I was also a Junior Research Fellow at Somerville College for several years.
I have edited two books and published nearly 100 articles. These include:
ETHICS
Kahane, G. and Savulescu, J. 2009. ‘Brain-Damage and the Moral Significance of Consciousness’, The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy.
Kahane, G., and Savulescu, J. 2009. ‘The Welfarist Account of Disability’, in K. Brownlee and A. Cureton, eds., Disability and Disadvantage, Oxford University Press.
Kahane, G. 2011. ‘Evolutionary Debunking Arguments’, Noûs.
Kahane, G. 2011. ‘Should We Want God to Exist?’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Kahane, G. 2011. ‘Mastery Without Mystery: Why there is no Promethean Sin in Enhancement’, The Journal of Applied Philosophy.
Kahane, G. 2014. ‘Our Cosmic Insignificance’, Noûs.
Kahane, G. 2017. ‘If Nothing Matters’, Noûs.
Kahane, G. 2019. ‘History and Persons’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Savulescu, J. Kahane, G. and Gyngell, C., 2019. ‘From Public Preferences to Ethical Policy’, Nature: Human Behaviour.
Kahane, G. 2021. ‘Is the Universe Indifferent? Should We Care?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Kahane, G. ‘Meaningfulness and Importance’ forthcoming in Landau, I., ed., The Oxford Handbook of Meaning in Life, OUP.
MORAL PSYCHOLOGY/NEUROSCIENCE
Kahane, G., Wiech, K., Shackel, N., Farias, M., Savulescu J. and Tracey, I. 2012. ‘The Neural Basis of Intuitive and Counterintuitive Moral Judgement’, Social, Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience.
Kahane, G., Everett, J., Earp, B., Farias, M. and Savulescu, J., 2015. ‘‘Utilitarian’ Judgment in Sacrificial Dilemmas Does Not Reflect Impartial Concern for the Greater Good’.
Kahane, G., Everett, J., Earp, B., Caviola, L., Faber, N., Crockett, M., Savulescu, J. 2018. ‘Beyond Sacrificial Harm: A Two-Dimensional Model of Utilitarian Psychology’, Psychological Review.
Kahane, G. 2016. ‘Is, Ought, and the Brain’, in S. M. Liao, ed., Moral Brains: The Neuroscience of Morality, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Demaree-Cotton, J. and Kahane, G. 2019. ‘The Neuroscience of Moral Judgment’, in A. Zimmerman, K. Jones, and M. Timmons, eds., The Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology.
Everett, J. and Kahane, G. 2020. ‘Switching Tracks: A Multi-Dimensional Model of Utilitarian Psychology’, Trends in Cognitive Sciences.
Wilks, M., Caviola, L., Kahane, G., Bloom, P. 2021. ‘Children Prioritize Humans Over Animals Less Than Adults Do’, Psychological Science.
Caviola, L., Kahane, G., Everett, J., Teperman, E., Savulescu, J., and Faber, N. 2021. ‘Utilitarianism for Animals, Kantianism for People? Harming Animals and Humans for the Greater Good’, the Journal of Experimental Psychology: General.